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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

ANTONIO SANCHEZ OCHOA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ED W. CAMPBELL, Director of Yakima
County Department of Corrections;
SCOTT HIMES, Chief of the Yakima
County Department of Corrections; and
YAKIMA COUNTY,

Defendants.

NO. 1:17-cv-03124-SMJ

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Thursday, September 6, 2018
With Oral Argument: 10:00 a.m.
Richland, WA

I. MOTION

Defendants seek summary judgment dismissal of all claims alleged by
the plaintiff in this matter.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts pertinent to this motion are set forth in defendants' LR 56(1)(a)
statement of material facts (herein "DSF # __") (ECF No. 60).

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

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III. NATURE OF THE CLAIMS

Plaintiff Antonio Sanchez Ochoa ("Mr. Ochoa") brings a claim against Yakima County, the Director of its Department of Corrections, and the Chief of its Department of Corrections. Mr. Ochoa alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 45). The complaint asks for compensatory damages and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (*Id.*, ¶ 2).

IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. Fourth Amendment. The County's detention of Mr. Ochoa was at all times based solely on his pending state law criminal charges of second degree assault and malicious mischief. No Fourth Amendment seizure arises from the fact that bail bondspersons made independent business decisions not to work with Mr. Ochoa.

B. Qualified Immunity. Director Ed Campbell and Chief Scott Himes are entitled to qualified immunity. Even if Mr. Ochoa could demonstrate a Fourth Amendment violation, the conduct of Director Campbell and Chief Himes did not violate clearly established constitutional rights of Mr. Ochoa of which a reasonable person would have known.

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3 **C. Declaratory Ruling.** Mr. Ochoa is no longer in the custody of Yakima
4 County. A declaratory ruling would be inappropriate and serve no useful
5 purpose.
6

7 **D. Injunctive Relief.** Mr. Ochoa is no longer in the custody of Yakima
8 County. His claim for injunctive relief should be denied as moot.
9

10 **V. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

11 **A. Summary judgment standard.**

12 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any
13 material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
15

16 **B. Mr. Ochoa's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim should be dismissed.**

17 **1. Fourth Amendment claim elements.**

18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who,
19 acting under color of state law, violates the constitutional rights of another
20 person. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dep't of Public*
21 *Soc. Serv.*, 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). To succeed on a § 1983 claim,
22 Mr. Ochoa must show that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a
23 person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived him of his
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3 constitutional rights. *Long v. County of Los Angeles*, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th
4 Cir. 2006).

5
6 Mr. Ochoa alleges an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth
7 Amendment to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 45). Mr. Ochoa
8 must show that he was seized by an instrumentality put in place for the purpose
9 of achieving that result rather than as a mere effect of otherwise lawful
10 governmental conduct. *Brower v. County of Inyo*, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989).
11 He must also demonstrate that any seizure was unreasonable. *Id.*

12 13 14 **2. Mr. Ochoa's allegations.**

15 Mr. Ochoa's Fourth Amendment claim is directed at the manner in which
16 the Yakima County Jail processed receipt of a Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest
17 of Alien ("administrative warrant"), issued by ICE. The receipt of an
18 administrative warrant was entered into the electronic Jail Management System
19 ("JMS"). (DSF #15). The JMS then populated an online, publicly accessible
20 jail register. (*Id.*). The jail register identifies charges and warrants outstanding
21 for each inmate. (DSF #16). In the case of Mr. Ochoa, the register indicated
22 charges of First Degree Assault (not filed), Second Degree Assault, and Second
23 Degree Malicious Mischief, and that Mr. Ochoa was subject to an
24 "immigration hold" by ICE. (*Id.*)

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3 The Yakima County Jail documented the receipt of administrative
4 warrants issued by ICE for the purpose of ensuring that when inmates are
5 released from the County's custody, either by posting bail or upon the
6 termination of their local charges, they are released to ICE. (DSF #17).
7

8 Mr. Ochoa alleges that the manner in which the defendants recorded
9 receipt of an administrative warrant issued by ICE rendered him "unable to
10 secure services of a bail bondsperson to post bond on his criminal charges[.]"
11 (ECF No. 1, ¶ 41). Mr. Ochoa's allegations do not, as a matter of law,
12 demonstrate a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
13
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15 **3. Mr. Ochoa cannot identify an event of seizure giving rise to a**
16 **claim under the Fourth Amendment.**

17 The allegation that certain bail bonding companies refused to do
18 business with Mr. Ochoa because of the "immigration hold" notation cannot, as
19 a matter of law, establish a Fourth Amendment seizure. The County website
20 notation itself did nothing to Mr. Ochoa because it did not affect his detention.
21 The actions—or, more accurately, the inactions—of the bail bonds agents were
22 not “governmental termination of freedom of movement *through means*
23 *intentionally applied.*” *Brower*, 489 U.S. at 597 (emphasis in original). Mr.
24 Ochoa’s detention was the lawful result of his prior arrest on local charges.
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3 There was no new seizure—as the term is defined for Fourth Amendment
4 purposes—due to any effect that the website notation may have had on bail
5 bondspersons. The Fourth Amendment’s conception of seizure is not
6 adaptable to the claim made by Mr. Ochoa here, which relies on both a
7 predicate event (the notation, which even Mr. Ochoa does not claim was itself
8 a seizure) in conjunction with consequential actions of third persons who had
9 nothing to do with the County. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 45).
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13 **a. Posting notice on a website is not a "seizure" for**
14 **purposes of the Fourth Amendment.**

15 The essence of a Fourth Amendment seizure is an application of force or
16 a show of authority to which the accused yielded. *California v. Hodari D.*, 499
17 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1991) ("We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter,
18 to stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the meaning of
19 arrest[.]").
20

21 A seizure is a single event. *Id.*, 499 U.S. at 625 (citing *Thompson v.*
22 *Whitman*, 18 Wall. 457, 471, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1874)). It requires either physical
23 force or, absent physical force, submission to the assertion of authority. *Id.*, at
24 626.
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3 "Mere words will not constitute an arrest[.]" *Id.*, 499 U.S. at 626. No
4 seizure occurs, for example, where a police officer yells "Stop, in the name of
5 the law!" at a fleeing suspect who continues to flee. *Id.* No seizure occurs in
6 such circumstances because there is neither the application of physical force
7 nor submission to an assertion of authority. *Id.*
8
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10 Here, the seizure was Mr. Ochoa's initial arrest, which was lawful.
11 Posting a notice that Mr. Ochoa was the subject of an "immigration hold" by
12 ICE on a local jail register was not a seizure for purposes of the Fourth
13 Amendment. The act of posting the notice took place administratively. (DSF
14 #15). Mr. Ochoa was not physically touched. The notice did not require Mr.
15 Ochoa to submit to the County's custody. (DSF #17).
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18 The notice did not alter Mr. Ochoa's status relative to his detention in
19 Yakima County custody. (DSF #18, #21). Had Mr. Ochoa offered to post bail
20 on his local charges, the Yakima County Jail would have accepted bail and
21 released Mr. Ochoa from Yakima County custody. (DSF # 24).
22

23 Aside from the County's willingness to accept bail for Mr. Ochoa, even
24 ICE understood that bail remained available for him. In an email dated July 6,
25 2017, ICE employee Brenda McClain noted that "an 'ICE hold' does not
26 prevent a person from posting bail on their criminal charges." (DSF #7). This
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3 statement was echoed by ICE Assistant Field Director Michael Melendez, who
4 wrote in an email to Director Ed Campbell also dated July 6, 2017, that "[t]he
5 I-200 only serves as a mechanism for [Yakima County] to contact [ICE] should
6 an individual be released from the Yakima County Jail. It does not preclude
7 them from posting bail." (DSF #8).
8
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10 Mr. Ochoa's Fourth Amendment claim should be dismissed with
11 prejudice because posting notice of an "immigration hold" cannot, as a matter
12 of law, constitute an application of physical force and thus is not a seizure
13 under the Fourth Amendment.
14

15 **b. The website notice was a lawful governmental action**
16 **and any alleged effect it had on third parties is**
17 **irrelevant for seizure analysis.**

18 Mr. Ochoa's Fourth Amendment claim also fails because his explanation
19 of the occurrence of the seizure relies on alleged effects of the website posting
20 on third party bail bond agents. This is a causal narrative that implies an
21 alleged link between the website and Mr. Ochoas's access to bail, but it is not a
22 seizure.
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24 A plaintiff seeking to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment seizure must
25 show they were seized "by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in
26 place in order to achieve that result." *Brower*, 489 U.S. at 599. The
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3 intentionality of the actual restraint imposed on a person's freedom of
4 movement, rather than its mere causal effect, is the "sine qua non" of a Fourth
5 Amendment seizure. *United States v. Al Nasser*, 555 F.3d 722, 730 (2009).

7 No Fourth Amendment seizure arises from acts that have the incidental
8 effect of restraining the liberty of an individual and this remains true even if the
9 act itself was deliberately performed. *See Al Nasser*, 555 F.3d at 730, 732 (no
10 seizure occurred when police signaled to driver to continue driving and he
11 misinterpreted signal and stopped); *Logan v. City of Pullman*, 392 F. Supp. 2d
12 1246, 1260 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (where police officers sprayed pepper spray at
13 individuals on first floor of restaurant, persons on the second floor who
14 suffered secondary exposure to the pepper spray were not "seized" for purposes
15 of the Fourth Amendment because they "were not the deliberate and intended
16 object" of the use of the pepper spray).

17
18 Here, the jail register notation was lawful. The notation was recorded in
19 the same manner that the Yakima County Jail recorded notices of warrants or
20 criminal charges issued by any other jurisdiction. (DSF #18). Its purpose was
21 to ensure that when Mr. Ochoa was released from custody on his local criminal
22 charges, either by posting bail or the termination of his local charges, he was
23 released to ICE. (DSF #17). Its effect on bail bondspersons arising from their

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3 expectation that he would then be taken into custody by ICE was not a seizure.
4 (DSF #24).
5

6 No Fourth Amendment claim can arise from the happenstance that third
7 parties refused to do business with Mr. Ochoa due to the website notation. *Al*
8 *Nasser*, 555 F.3d at 732 (citing *Brower*, 489 U.S. at 596-97).
9

10 Mr. Ochoa's § 1983 claim against all defendants should be dismissed
11 with prejudice.
12

13 **4. This case is unlike cases in which courts have found Fourth**
14 **Amendment seizures in the immigration context.**

15 This case is factually distinguishable from others in which Fourth
16 Amendment violations have been found. The plaintiff in *Miranda-Olivares v.*
17 *Clackamas County*, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014), was told that
18 she would not be released from custody if she posted bail. *Id.*, at *2. More
19 importantly, the plaintiff was held in custody for 19 hours without lawful
20 authority after being entitled to release on her state law charges. *Id.*, at *3.
21

22 In *Orellana v. Nobles County*, 230 F. Supp. 3d 934 (D. Minn. 2017), the
23 plaintiff tried to post bail but was told by jail employees that they would not
24 accept the bail.
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3 Finally, the plaintiff in *Lunn v. Commonwealth*, 477 Mass. 517, 78
4 N.E.3d 1143 (2017), was held in custody without lawful authority after state
5 criminal charges against him had been dismissed.
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7 This case is not comparable. Mr. Ochoa never offered to post bail.
8 (DSF #22). No defendant told Mr. Ochoa he could not post bail. (DSF #23).
9
10 It was, and remains, the policy and practice of Yakima County to allow
11 inmates, including those for whom ICE had issued a Form I-200, to post bail.
12 (DSF #19). Mr. Ochoa was never held by Yakima County for any reason other
13 than his state law local charges. (DSF #21). The factual circumstances in
14 *Miranda-Olivera*, *Orellana*, and *Lunn* are distinguishable in ways that favor
15 summary judgment dismissal of Mr. Ochoa's Fourth Amendment claim.
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18 **C. Director Campbell and Chief Himes should be dismissed from this**
19 **lawsuit on grounds of qualified immunity.**

20 “[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for
21 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
22 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
23 known.’” *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting *Harlow v.*
24 *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity applies “regardless
25 of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact,
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3 or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” *Pearson*, 555 U.S. at
4 231 (internal citations omitted).
5

6 To address a qualified immunity claim, the Court must apply a two-
7 pronged test: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to
8 the plaintiff, show that the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right,
9 and (2) whether that right was “clearly established.” *Community House, Inc. v.*
10 *City of Boise, Idaho*, 623 F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Saucier v.*
11 *Katz*, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), *modified by Pearson*, 555 U.S. 223). Courts
12 need not address both prongs of the test and may “exercise their sound
13 discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
14 analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
15 case at hand.” *Community House, Inc.*, 623 F.3d at 967; *see also Pearson*, 555
16 U.S. 235.
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21 **1. No defendant violated Mr. Ochoa's constitutional rights.**

22 Where no constitutional right would be violated under the facts as
23 alleged by a plaintiff, "there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning
24 qualified immunity." *Saucier*, 533 U.S. at 201.
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26 For reasons explained more fully, *supra*, Section V.B, Mr. Ochoa cannot
27 establish that any conduct attributable to any defendant resulted in a seizure
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3 implicating the Fourth Amendment. Defendants Director Campbell and Chief
4 Himes are entitled to dismissal on grounds of qualified immunity.
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6 **2. Mr. Ochoa's constitutional rights were not clearly established.**

7 For a constitutional right to be clearly established, "its contours must be
8 sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
9 doing violates that right." *Boyd v. Benton County*, 374 F.3d 773, 780-81 (9th
10 Cir. 2004). "[A]n officer who makes a reasonable mistake as to what the law
11 requires under a given set of circumstances is entitled to the immunity
12 defense." *Id.* at 781 (citation omitted). The pertinent inquiry is whether a
13 reasonable officer would have understood that posting notice of an immigration
14 hold on the jail register would give rise to a seizure for purposes of the Fourth
15 Amendment.
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19 The Court begins this inquiry by looking to binding precedent. *Id.* In
20 the absence of binding precedent, the Court looks to whatever law is available
21 to ascertain whether the law is clearly established for qualified immunity
22 purposes. *Id.* (citing *Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim*, 343
23 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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26 Case law establishes several guiding rules. Yakima County may not
27 detain an inmate in Yakima County's custody absent probable cause to believe
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3 the inmate committed a criminal offense. *Miranda-Olivera*, 2014 WL 1414305
4 at *9-11. Likewise, Yakima County must allow an inmate to post bail on local
5 criminal charges regardless of whether it has been notified that ICE wants to
6 obtain custody of that individual. *Id.*, at 11. The policies implemented by the
7 Yakima County Department of Corrections under the direction of Director
8 Campbell and Chief Himes are consistent with this authority. (*See* DSF #29).
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11 Defendants are unaware of any authority that would support the
12 proposition that a public notice, without more, can amount to a Fourth
13 Amendment seizure. The plaintiff in *Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E.*
14 *Agents*, 657 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Colo. 2009), alleged a due process violation
15 against ICE agents who lodged, and later withdrew, an immigration detainer
16 (Form I-247) against the plaintiff while he was detained in the Denver County
17 Jail on state law charges. Rejecting the plaintiff's claims, the district court
18 noted that "[a]most all of the circuit courts considering the issue have
19 determined that the lodging of an immigration detainer, without more, is
20 insufficient to render someone in custody." 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (citation
21 omitted).
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26 Yakima County noted its receipt of an administrative warrant on the jail
27 register but no new custodial detention by Yakima County occurred at all. To
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3 find that these facts amount to violation of a clearly established right would be
4 inconsistent with *Nasious*, which is the only known potentially relevant case
5 authority.
6

7 Under these circumstances, and particularly given Yakima County's
8 policy of accepting bail for inmates subject to administrative warrants issued
9 by ICE, reasonable officers in Director Campbell's and Chief Himes' positions
10 would not have realized that creating an "immigration hold" notation on the jail
11 register would give rise to a Fourth Amendment seizure.
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14 Summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against Director
15 Campbell and Chief Himes on the basis of qualified immunity is appropriate.
16

17 **D. Mr. Ochoa's claim for declaratory relief should be denied.**

18 Mr. Ochoa asks the Court for a declaratory ruling that the defendants'
19 imposition of an immigration hold on him is unconstitutional. (ECF No. 1, ¶
20 2). The request for a declaratory ruling should be denied.
21

22 The federal Declaratory Judgment Act at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202
23 requires an actual case or controversy between the parties before a federal court
24 can constitutionally assume jurisdiction. *Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Alberta*
25 *Telecommunications Research Ctr.*, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 (N.D. Cal.
26 2012), *aff'd*, 538 F. App'x 894 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In determining whether to
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3 exercise declaratory jurisdiction, federal courts "should consider whether a
4 declaratory judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the
5 legal relations between the parties, and whether it will terminate the
6 controversy." *Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass'n v. Eu*, 979 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir.
7 1992).
8
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10 Resolution of Mr. Ochoa's § 1983 claim will resolve the dispute between
11 the parties and a declaratory judgment will serve no purpose. Mr. Ochoa has
12 been deported. *Sanchez Ochoa v. Campbell et. al.*, 716 Fed. Appx. 741, 742
13 (9th Cir. 2018).¹ There is little probability that the policies and practices
14 challenged by Mr. Ochoa may again be enforced against him. Under these
15 circumstances, the Court should decline to issue a declaratory ruling. *United*
16 *Sweetener USA, Inc. v. Nutrasweet Co.*, 766 F. Supp. 212, 216 (D. Del. 1991)
17 (declaratory ruling inappropriate where it "would serve no useful purpose").
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21 Should the Court be inclined to issue a declaratory ruling, the Court
22 should find that the policies and practices of the defendants are lawful for
23 reasons more fully set forth *supra*, Section V.B.
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25 **E. Mr. Ochoa's claim for injunctive relief should be denied as moot.**
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28 ¹ Cited pursuant to LR 7(f)(2).

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3 Mr. Ochoa asks the Court for injunctive relief requiring the defendants
4 to "immediately remove the unlawful immigration hold[.]" (ECF No. 1, ¶ 2).
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6 Mr. Ochoa has posted bail, been released from the Yakima County Jail, and
7 been deported by ICE. (DSF #27, #28). The request for injunctive relief
8 should be denied as moot.
9

10 **VI. CONCLUSION**

11 For the reasons set forth above, all claims alleged by Mr. Ochoa in this
12 matter should be dismissed with prejudice.
13

14 DATED THIS 6th day of July, 2018.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 6, 2018, I filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants:

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