

*The Honorable Marsha J. Pechman*

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

YOLANY PADILLA, on behalf of herself and her 6-year-old son J.A.; IBIS GUZMAN, on behalf of herself and her 5-year-old son R.G.; BLANCA ORANTES, on behalf of herself and her 8-year-old son A.M.; BALTAZAR VASQUEZ, on behalf of himself;

Plaintiffs-Petitioners,

v.

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (“ICE”); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (“DHS”); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (“CBP”); U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (“USCIS”); EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (“EOIR”); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (“HHS”); OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (“ORR”); THOMAS HOMAN, Acting Director of ICE; KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of DHS; KEVIN K. McALEENAN, Acting Commissioner of CBP; L. FRANCIS CISSNA, Director of USCIS; ALEX M. AZAR II, Secretary of HHS; SCOTT LLOYD, Director of ORR; MARC J. MOORE, Seattle Field Office Director, ICE; JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General; LOWELL CLARK, warden of the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington; CHARLES INGRAM, warden of the Federal Detention Center in SeaTac, Washington; DAVID SHINN, warden of the Federal Correctional Institute in Victorville, California;

Defendants-Respondents.

No. 2:18-cv-928 MJP

**PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION  
FOR CLASS  
CERTIFICATION OF THE  
AMENDED  
COMPLAINT’S  
“CREDIBLE FEAR  
INTERVIEW CLASS” &  
“BOND HEARING  
CLASS”**

NOTE ON MOTION  
CALENDAR:  
AUGUST 24, 2018.

**(ORAL ARGUMENT  
REQUESTED)**

PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERT MOTION RE:  
“CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW CLASS” &  
“BOND HEARING CLASS”

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PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERT MOTION RE:  
“CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW CLASS” &  
“BOND HEARING CLASS” - i

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1 **I. SUMMARY OF THIS MOTION**

2 Class actions across the country are challenging various aspects of the federal  
3 government's "zero-tolerance" policy to deter immigration. This suit challenges that policy's  
4 implementation with respect to credible fear determinations and bond hearings for people  
5 seeking asylum in the United States.<sup>1</sup>

6 **Background:** Plaintiffs and their children fled to the United States seeking asylum from  
7 the persecution they faced in their countries of origin. They asked federal agents for asylum, and  
8 were immediately incarcerated. The government then prolonged their incarceration by delaying  
9 the credible fear interview required to commence their asylum application process. And once the  
10 government eventually provided some plaintiffs the credible fear interview to which they are  
11 legally entitled, the government further prolonged their incarceration by delaying and denying  
12 the bond hearing to which they are legally entitled for ascertaining reasonable conditions for  
13 release pending adjudication of their asylum claim. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint contends  
14 that the government's practice of failing to promptly provide detained asylum seekers the  
15 credible fear interview and bond hearing required by law violates asylum seekers' statutory and  
16 constitutional rights.<sup>2</sup>

17 This motion does not seek judgment on the merits. Instead, it asks this court to certify  
18 the Amended Complaint's "Credible Fear Interview Class" and "Bond Hearing Class" so that  
19 when the merits are soon addressed and ruled upon (one way or the other), defendants are bound  
20 by the same legal requirements for all similarly situated asylum seekers.

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23 <sup>1</sup> See Amended Complaint, ¶¶1, 4-7, 128-129, 140-157, 159-166, 171-178, 180-181, 184-192,  
24 195-209, 214-217. (Plaintiffs have put their family separation claim on hold pending  
25 defendants' promised compliance with the nationwide injunction issued in *Ms. L v. ICE*,  
S.D.Cal. case no. 18cv0428 DMS (MDD), docket no. 83. Amended Complaint at ¶¶2-3.)

26 <sup>2</sup> Amended Complaint at ¶¶1, 4-7, 128-129, 140-157, 159-166, 171-178, 180-181, 184-192, 195-  
209, 214-217.

1           **“Credible Fear Interview Class”**: Plaintiffs filed this suit as detained asylum seekers in  
2 expedited removal proceedings who were not provided their credible fear determination within  
3 10 days of requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official.<sup>3</sup>

4           Defendants cannot truthfully deny this fact.<sup>4</sup> But they do disagree with plaintiffs on  
5 whether this prolonging of asylum seekers’ detention violates the law.<sup>5</sup>

6           To give plaintiffs, similarly situated asylum seekers, and federal defendants one  
7 consistent answer with respect to this question of law, plaintiffs ask this court to certify the  
8 Amended Complaint’s **“Credible Fear Interview Class”**:

9           All detained asylum seekers in the United States subject to expedited removal  
10 proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) who are not provided a credible fear  
11 determination within 10 days of requesting asylum or expressing a fear of  
persecution to a DHS official.<sup>6</sup>

12 As explained later in this motion, the above class should be certified because it satisfies all four  
13 criteria in Rule 23(a), and fits into at least one of the alternative categories in Rule 23(b).

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21 <sup>3</sup> Amended Complaint at ¶¶4-5, 96, 97-113.

22 <sup>4</sup> For example, defendants own documentation for each plaintiff confirms plaintiffs’ situation  
23 (e.g., defendant DHS’s Record Of Deportable Alien for each plaintiff and defendant DHS’s  
24 Record Of Determination regarding plaintiffs). Examples of such defendant documents for  
plaintiffs Padilla, Orantes, and Guzman are attached to as exhibits to the contemporaneously  
filed Declaration Of Glenda M. Aldana Madrid In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class  
Certification.

25 <sup>5</sup> Plaintiffs maintain defendants’ delays violate the law. Amended Complaint at ¶¶171-174, 184-  
185, 195-200, 214-215. Since defendants knowingly impose these delays, they must disagree.

26 <sup>6</sup> Amended Complaint at ¶¶140 (class definition), 128-129, 141-148.

1  
2 **“Bond Hearing Class”**: Some plaintiffs are detained asylum seekers who also were not  
3 provided a bond hearing with procedural safeguards within 7 days of requesting it.<sup>7</sup>

4 Defendants cannot truthfully deny this fact.<sup>8</sup> But they do disagree with plaintiffs on  
5 whether this further prolonging of asylum seekers’ detention violates the law.<sup>9</sup>

6 To give plaintiffs, similarly situated asylum seekers, and federal defendants one  
7 consistent answer with respect to this question of law, plaintiffs ask this court to certify the  
8 Amended Complaint’s **“Bond Hearing Class”**:

9 All detained asylum seekers who entered the United States without inspection,  
10 were initially subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b),  
11 were determined to have a credible fear of persecution, but are not provided a  
12 bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing within 7 days  
13 of requesting a bond hearing.<sup>10</sup>

14 As explained later in this motion, the above class should be certified because it satisfies all four  
15 criteria in Rule 23(a), and fits into at least one of the alternative categories in Rule 23(b).  
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19 <sup>7</sup> Amended Complaint at ¶¶6-7, 118-126. Plaintiff Vasquez too is a detained asylum seeker who  
20 still has not be provided any bond hearing – but he has not even been provided his credible fear  
21 interview yet. Amended Complaint at ¶127. (The defendant DHS documentation noted in  
22 footnote 4 and defendant EOIR documentation noted in footnote 8 would confirm this fact  
23 regarding plaintiff Vasquez.)

24 <sup>8</sup> For example, defendants own documentation for each plaintiff confirms plaintiffs’ situation  
25 (e.g., defendant EOIR’s Custody Order for plaintiffs eventually allowed a bond hearing).  
26 Examples of such defendant documents for plaintiffs Padilla, Orantes, and Guzman are attached  
to as exhibits to the contemporaneously filed Declaration Of Glenda M. Aldana Madrid In  
Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification.

<sup>9</sup> Plaintiffs maintain defendants’ delays violate the law. Amended Complaint at ¶¶175-178, 186-  
189, 201-205, 216-217. Since defendants knowingly impose these delays, they must disagree.

<sup>10</sup> Amended Complaint at ¶¶46-47 (meaning of “without inspection” in immigration context),  
149 (class definition), 128-129, 150-157.

## **II. BACKGROUND CONTEXT**

### **A. Commence “Zero-Tolerance” Policy (*deter asylum seekers entering the U.S.*)**

Attorney General Sessions announced the commencement of the federal government’s “Zero-Tolerance Policy” on April 6, 2018.<sup>11</sup> As defendants cannot truthfully deny, this policy’s purpose is to deter people from entering the United States with criminal prosecutions and subjecting persons seeking asylum to prolonged, uncertain confinement pending adjudication of their asylum claims.<sup>12</sup>

### **B. Delay the Credible Fear Interviews Required by Law** (*prolong asylum seekers’ incarceration*)

An asylum seeker in expedited removal proceedings is subject to mandatory detention until DHS interviews that asylum seeker to determine if he or she has the credible fear of persecution required to assign his or her asylum claim to the immigration court for adjudication on the merits.<sup>13</sup> Thus, one way to deter people from seeking asylum is to prolong their incarceration by delaying the credible fear interview to which they are legally entitled once they request asylum or express a fear of persecution to a DHS official.<sup>14</sup>

### **C. Delay the Bond Hearings Required by Law** (*further prolong asylum seekers’ incarceration*)

Detained asylum seekers who are determined to have a credible fear of persecution in their credible fear interview are entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge to ascertain reasonable conditions for their release from incarceration while they await the government’s lengthy process of adjudicating their asylum claim (e.g., a reasonable bond

<sup>11</sup> See <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry>

<sup>12</sup> See, e.g., *Amended Complaint* at ¶¶56-59, 91-95, 114-117.

<sup>13</sup> 8 C.F.R. §235.3(b)(4)(ii) (*detention*) & §208.30(f) (*credible fear interview*); see generally *Amended Complaint* at ¶¶4-5, 92-95.

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., *Amended Complaint* at ¶¶91, 96-113. *Delaying the credible fear interview to which they are legally entitled can take the form of putting that interview off in time as well as providing an “interview” that does not comply with the law.*

1 amount, specific reporting conditions, parole without posting a monetary bond, etc.).<sup>15</sup> Thus,  
 2 another way to deter people from seeking asylum is to prolong their incarceration by delaying  
 3 the bond hearing to which they are legally entitled after they pass their credible fear interview  
 4 and denying basic procedural safeguards at that hearing like a recording or transcript to allow  
 5 adverse decisions to be meaningfully appealed.<sup>16</sup>

6 **D. United States Constitution (5<sup>th</sup> & 8<sup>th</sup> Amendments)**

7 Although this motion does not seek any judgment on the merits, plaintiffs briefly note  
 8 their constitutional claim is that the federal government's above practices which willfully  
 9 prolong the incarceration of persons fleeing for safety and asylum in the United States violates  
 10 the 5<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Amendments of the United States Constitution.<sup>17</sup>

11 **E. Federal Law (statutes & regulations)**

12 Similarly, although this motion does not seek any judgment on the merits, plaintiffs also  
 13 note their statutory and regulatory claims are the government's above practices which willfully  
 14 prolong the incarceration of asylum seekers (1) constitute actions that are arbitrary, capricious,  
 15 unlawfully withheld, or unreasonably delayed in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act  
 16

17 <sup>15</sup> 8 C.F.R. §208.30(f), §236.1(d); see generally Amended Complaint at ¶¶6-7, 92.

18 <sup>16</sup> See, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶¶114-117. Delaying the bond hearing to which they are  
 19 legally entitled can take the form of putting that hearing off in time as well as providing a bond  
 "hearing" that does not comply with the law.

20 <sup>17</sup> Amended Complaint at ¶¶8-10, 159-166. 171-178 (5<sup>th</sup> Amendment's prohibiting the federal  
 21 government from depriving any person of their liberty without due process of law, and  
 22 8<sup>th</sup> Amendment's prohibiting the federal government from imposing or inflicting on any person  
 any excessive bail or any cruel punishments); see also, e.g., *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678  
 23 (2001)(5<sup>th</sup> Amendment' protects against punitive detention even in civil immigration  
 proceedings, requiring that the detention be tied to its lawful purpose); *Landon v. Plasencia*, 459  
 24 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (5<sup>th</sup> Amendment's due process clause protects citizens and noncitizens  
 physically present in the United States); *Mathews v. Diaz*, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (same);  
 25 *Wilkinson v. Austin*, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (due process requires compliance with fair  
 procedures prior to any deprivation of an individual's protected liberty or property interest);  
 26 *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of due process is  
 the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner") (internal  
 quotation marks and citations omitted).



1 (5 U.S.C. §706), and (2) unlawfully impede asylum seekers’ exercising their right under federal  
 2 law to apply for safety and asylum in the United States (e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§1225 &1158;  
 3 8 C.F.R. §§235.3, 208.30, & 1003.42).<sup>18</sup>

4 **F. Relief Ultimately Sought (*declarations & injunctions*)**

5 Lastly, although this motion does not seek the judicial relief ultimately sought in this  
 6 case, plaintiffs note their Amended Complaint requests (1) declaratory relief to resolve the  
 7 parties’ disagreement over whether (and how) the credible fear interview and bond hearing  
 8 practices at issue in this case violate the United States Constitution and federal law, and  
 9 (2) injunctive relief requiring defendants to cease what this court’s declaratory judgment declares  
 10 illegal.<sup>19</sup>

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 15 <sup>18</sup> *Amended Complaint at ¶¶11-13, 180-181, 184-192, 195-209, 214-217; see also*  
 16 *5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary,*  
 17 *capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”); Ctr. for*  
 18 *Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.*, 538 F.3d 1172, 1193 (9th Cir.  
 19 *2008) (APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard requires government agency to “supply a*  
 20 *reasoned basis for the agency’s action” (internal quotation marks omitted); 5 U.S.C. §706(1)*  
 21 *(court must “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”);*  
 22 *8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(B) (requiring the provision of credible fear interviews and*  
 23 *determinations); 8 CFR 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1) (providing individual with the right to request*  
 24 *a bond hearing after ICE’s initial custody determination); Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. CIA, 811*  
 25 *F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (plaintiffs entitled to relief when there is a “specific, unequivocal*  
 26 *command placed on the agency to take a discrete agency action, and the agency has failed to*  
*take that action” (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 63-64*  
*(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); 5 U.S.C. §555(b) (agency has a duty under the APA*  
*to conclude matters presented to it within a “reasonable time”); Orantes-Hernandez v.*  
*Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is undisputed that all [noncitizens] possess”*  
*a statutory “right” to apply for asylum) (citing 8 U.S.C. §1158(a) (1988); Jean v. Nelson, 727*  
*F.2d 957, 982 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff’d as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (same);*  
*Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1982) (same).*

<sup>19</sup> *Amended Complaint at ¶14 and Prayers For Relief F-O.*

1 **III. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED**

2 This motion raises two issues for this court to decide:

- 3 1. Does the “**Credible Fear Interview Class**” satisfy all four criteria in Rule 23(a)  
4 and fit one of the alternative categories in Rule 23(b)?
- 5 2. Does the “**Bond Hearing Class**” satisfy all four criteria in Rule 23(a) and fit one  
6 of the alternative categories in Rule 23(b)?

7 **IV. LEGAL DISCUSSION**

8 **A. Satisfying Rule 23(a) & (b) Entitles a Movant to Class Certification.**

9 Supreme Court case law holds that plaintiffs’ suit is entitled to Rule 23 class certification  
10 if two conditions are met:

11 The suit must satisfy the criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity,  
12 commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into  
13 one of the three categories described in subdivision (b). By its terms this creates a  
14 categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to  
15 pursue his claim as a class action.

16 *Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (internal  
17 citation omitted).

18 As the following pages explain, plaintiffs are entitled to pursue their credible fear  
19 interview and bond hearing claims as a class action because the Credible Fear Interview Class  
20 and Bond Hearing Class:

- 21 • satisfy all four Rule 23(a) criteria (*numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy  
22 of representation*), and
- 23 • fit into the second Rule 23(b) category (“*final injunctive relief or corresponding  
24 declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.*”).

25 Consistent with numerous Ninth Circuit decisions certifying class actions on behalf of  
26 noncitizens challenging immigration policies and practices, plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to  
class certification in this case.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *E.g., Mendez Rojas, et al. v. Johnson, et al.*, 2:16-cv-1024-RSM, ECF No. 37 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 2017) (certifying two nationwide classes of asylum seekers challenging defective asylum

1 **B. The “Credible Fear Interview Class” satisfies all four criteria of Rule 23(a) and at**  
 2 **least one of the alternative categories in Rule 23(b).**

3 This is the “Credible Fear Interview Class” requested in the Amended Complaint.<sup>21</sup>

4 All detained asylum seekers in the United States subject to expedited  
 5 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)  
 6 who are not provided a credible fear determination within 10 days of  
 7 requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official.

8 **1. Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1))**

9 The first Rule 23(a) criterion is that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members  
 10 is impracticable.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1).

11 “Impracticable” does not mean “impossible.” Instead, impracticable relates to the  
 12 difficulty or inconvenience of individually joining all class members as parties. *Harris v. Palm*  
 13 *Springs Alpine Est., Inc.*, 329 F.2d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1964) (“ ‘impracticability’ does not

14  
 15 application procedures); *A.B.T. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services*, 2013 WL 5913323  
 16 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2013) (certifying nationwide class and approving settlement amending  
 17 practices by the Executive Office for Immigration Review and USCIS that precluded asylum  
 18 applicants from receiving employment authorization); *Santillan v. Ashcroft*, No. C 04-2686,  
 19 2004 WL 2297990, at \*12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2004) (certifying nationwide class of lawful  
 20 permanent residents challenging delays in receiving documentation of their status); *Ali v.*  
 21 *Ashcroft*, 213 F.R.D. 390, 409-10 (W.D. Wash. 2003), *aff’d*, 346 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2003),  
 22 *vacated on other grounds*, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005) (certifying nationwide class of Somalis  
 23 challenging legality of removal to Somalia in the absence of a functioning government);  
 24 *Gorbach v. Reno*, 181 F.R.D. 642, 644 (W.D. Wash. 1998), *aff’d on other grounds*, 219 F.3d  
 25 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (*en banc*) (certifying nationwide class of persons challenging validity of  
 26 administrative denaturalization proceedings); *Walters v. Reno*, No. C94-1204C, 1996 WL  
 897662, at \*5-8 (W.D. Wash. 1996), *aff’d*, 145 F.3d 1032, 1045-47 (9th Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*,  
*Reno v. Walters*, 526 U.S. 1003 (1999) (certifying nationwide class of individuals challenging  
 adequacy of notice in document fraud cases). See also *Roshandel v. Chertoff*, 554 F. Supp. 2d  
 1194 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (certifying districtwide class of delayed naturalization cases); *Gete v.*  
*INS*, 121 F.3d 1285, 1299 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating district court’s denial of class certification  
 in case challenging inadequate notice and standards in Immigration and Naturalization Service  
 vehicle forfeiture procedure).

<sup>21</sup> Amended Complaint at ¶¶140 (class definition), 128-129, 141-148.

PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERT MOTION RE:  
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1 mean ‘impossibility,’ but only the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the  
2 class”) (citation omitted).

3 And “numerous” does not require a large number of class members – for relatively few  
4 class members can suffice. E.g., *Arkansas Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. Of Educ.*, 446 F.2d 763, 765-66  
5 (8th Cir. 1971) (17 class members held sufficient); *McCluskey v. Trs. Of Red Dot Corp.*  
6 *Employee Stock Ownership Plan & Trust*, 268 F.R.D. 670, 674-76 (W.D. Wash. 2010)  
7 (certifying class with 27 known members); *Jones v. Diamond*, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 (5th Cir.  
8 1975) (class membership of 48); *Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.*, 555 F.2d 270, 275  
9 (10th Cir. 1977) (41-46 class members); *Perez-Funez v. District Director, Immigration &*  
10 *Naturalization Service*, 611 F. Supp. 990, 995 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (no specific number of class  
11 members is required to satisfy numerosity).

12 Plaintiffs believe that at least several hundred asylum seekers currently fit within the  
13 Credible Fear Interview Class defined above.<sup>22</sup> Defendants know the exact number of asylum  
14 seekers they are detaining without providing a credible fear determination within the specified  
15 10 days. And defendants cannot truthfully deny that that exact number is far larger than the 17,  
16 27, 41, 46, and 48 members that were sufficiently “numerous” for class certification in the cases  
17 cited above.

18 Nor can defendants truthfully deny that it would be impracticable to join all the  
19 individual members of the Credible Fear Interview Class in this suit. For example, defendant  
20 ICE has stated that it transferred 1,600 asylum seekers to prisons all across the country.<sup>23</sup> These  
21 included 206 asylum seekers transferred to Washington State alone to wait for their credible fear  
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23

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>22</sup> *Amended Complaint at ¶¶41-42 (alleging on information and belief that at least several*  
26 *hundred asylum seekers currently fit within the credible fear interview class); see also*  
*footnotes 23-24 and paragraphs to which those footnotes are attached.*

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.npr.org/2018/06/08/618182740/ice-to-send-1-600-detainees-to-federal-prisons>.

1 interviews and determinations, all of whom were required to wait for weeks and sometimes  
2 months for credible fear determinations.<sup>24</sup>

3 Moreover, even though the number of current class members satisfies the numerosity  
4 criterion, three additional reasons establish that satisfaction in this case as well: First, case law  
5 confirms that since plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief, the “requirement is relaxed  
6 and plaintiffs may rely on [] reasonable inference[s] arising from plaintiffs’ other evidence that  
7 the number of unknown and future members of [the] proposed subclass ... is sufficient to make  
8 joinder impracticable.” *Arnott v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.*, 290 F.R.D. 579, 586  
9 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting *Sueoka v. United States*, 101 Fed. App’x 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2004)).  
10 Second, the proposed class includes individuals who will be subjected to the defendants’ delays  
11 in the future – and case law confirms that when the class includes “unnamed and unknown future  
12 members,” joinder is impractical and thus “the numerosity requirement is ... met, regardless of  
13 class size.” *Ali v. Ashcroft*, 213 F.R.D. 390, 408 (W.D. Wash. 2003), aff’d, 346 F.3d 873 (9th  
14 Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and  
15 citation omitted). And third, even if numerosity were a close question here (which it is not), case  
16 law shows this court should still certify the class at this initial stage, subject to decertification if  
17 the class winnows down to be much smaller. See *Stewart v. Associates Consumer Discount Co.*,  
18 183 F.R.D. 189, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (“[W]here the numerosity question is a close one, the trial  
19 court should find that numerosity exists, since the court has the option to decertify the class later  
20 pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1).”).

21 In short: the Credible Fear Interview Class defined above satisfies the  
22 numerosity/impracticality criterion of Rule 23(a)(1).  
23  
24  
25

26 <sup>24</sup> *Declaration Of Ashleen O’Brien In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification.*

1           **2. Commonality** (*Rule 23(a)(2)*)

2           The second Rule 23(a) criterion is that “there are questions of law or fact common to the  
3 class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2).

4           One issue of law or fact common among class members, standing alone, is enough to  
5 satisfy this criterion. See, e.g., *Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez*, 248 F.R.D. 248, 257 (C.D. Cal. 2008)  
6 (“Courts have found that a single common issue of law or fact is sufficient.”) (citation omitted);  
7 *Sweet v. Pfizer*, 232 F.R.D. 360, 367 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“there must only be one single issue  
8 common to the proposed class”) (quotation and citation omitted).

9           Different class members having different circumstances or other individual issues does  
10 not defeat that commonality. E.g., *Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith*, 541 F. Supp. 351, 370 (C.D.  
11 Cal. 1982) (granting certification in challenge to common government practices in asylum cases,  
12 even though the outcome of individual asylum cases would depend on individual class members’  
13 varying entitlement to relief); *Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell*, 688 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th  
14 Cir. 2012) (even when “the circumstances of each particular class member vary but retain a  
15 common core of factual or legal issues with the rest of the class, commonality exists”) (internal  
16 quotation marks omitted); *Walters v. Reno*, 145 F.3d 1032, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Differences  
17 among the class members with respect to the merits of their actual document fraud cases,  
18 however, are simply insufficient to defeat the propriety of class certification. What makes the  
19 plaintiffs’ claims suitable for a class action is the common allegation that the INS’s procedures  
20 provide insufficient notice.”); *Arnott v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.*, 290 F.R.D. 579,  
21 586-87 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (factual variations not defeat certification where core legal issues were  
22 similar).

23           Commonality accordingly exists if class members “have suffered the same injury,” and  
24 that injury is “of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution – which means that  
25 determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one  
26 of the claims in one stroke.” *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (quoting

1 *Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). For example: when a common  
 2 answer on the legality of a defendant’s action will “drive the resolution of the litigation.” *Ellis v.*  
 3 *Costco Wholesale Corp.*, 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Dukes*, 564 U.S. at 350).

4 By definition, the Credible Fear Interview Class is expressly limited to members who  
 5 have suffered the same injury – i.e., being a detained asylum seeker in the United States subject  
 6 to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) who was not provided a credible fear  
 7 determination within 10 days of requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS  
 8 official.<sup>25</sup>

9 And that injury – the government’s failing to provide such asylum seekers their credible  
 10 fear determination within 10 days of requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a  
 11 DHS official – is capable of class-wide resolution through declaratory relief declaring that failure  
 12 unlawful under the Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, APA, or federal asylum statutes, and  
 13 injunctive relief requiring the government’s unlawful conduct to cease.

14 In short: the Credible Fear Interview Class defined above satisfies the commonality  
 15 criterion of Rule 23(a)(2).

### 16 **3. Typicality** (*Rule 23(a)(3)*)

17 The third Rule 23(a) criterion is that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties  
 18 are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3).

19 “Typical” simply means that “a class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess  
 20 the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” *Gen. Tel. Co. of the*  
 21 *Southwest v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (citation omitted).

22 Factual differences among class members therefore do not defeat typicality in a case (like  
 23 this one) that involves a defendant’s uniform policy or practice, the named plaintiffs have

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
 25 <sup>25</sup> As noted earlier, the Credible Fear Interview Class is defined as “All detained asylum seekers  
 26 in the United States subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) who are  
 not provided a credible fear determination within 10 days of requesting asylum or expressing a  
 fear of persecution to a DHS official.. *Supra*, Section IV.B.

1 injuries similar to those of the class members, and plaintiffs’ injuries result from the same,  
2 injurious course of conduct. *Armstrong v. Davis*, 275 F.3d 849, 869 (2001) (quoting *Hanon v.*  
3 *Dataproducts Corp.*, 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also, e.g., *Hanlon v. Chrysler*  
4 *Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (the rule’s “permissive” typicality standard simply requires the  
5 plaintiff representative’s claims to be “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class  
6 members; they need not be substantially identical”); *LaDuke v. Nelson*, 762 F.2d 1318, 1332  
7 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The minor differences in the manner in which the representative’s Fourth  
8 Amendment rights were violated does not render their claims atypical of those of the class.”);  
9 *Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch.*, 2 F.Supp. 2d 1324, 1342 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (“When it is  
10 alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and  
11 the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually satisfied, irrespective of  
12 varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.”) (citation omitted); cf. *Marisol A. v.*  
13 *Giuliani*, 126 F.3d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1997) (certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class despite differences in  
14 the exact nature of the harm suffered by class members).

15 In this case, plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the government’s prolonging their  
16 incarceration by delaying their credible fear interview are not just typical of other Credible Fear  
17 Interview Class members. They’re the same. By definition, plaintiffs and the other Credible  
18 Fear Interview Class members suffered the same injury in fact: not being provided a credible  
19 fear determination within 10 days of requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a  
20 DHS official. And plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the legality of that government conduct is  
21 that same as fellow class members: it’s unlawful under the Fifth Amendment, Eighth  
22 Amendment, APA, and federal asylum statutes.

23 In short: the Credible Fear Interview Class defined above satisfies the typicality criterion  
24 of Rule 23(a)(3).



1                   **4. Adequate Representation** *(Rule 23(a)(4))*

2                   The fourth Rule 23(a) criterion is that “the representative parties will fairly and  
3 adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4).

4                   Satisfying this adequacy criterion “depends on the qualifications of counsel for the  
5 representatives, an absence of antagonism, a sharing of interests between representatives and  
6 absentees, and the unlikelihood that the suit is collusive.” *Rodriguez v. Hayes*, 591 F.3d 1105,  
7 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing *Walters v. Reno*, 145 F.3d 1032,  
8 1046 (9th Cir. 1998), quoting *Crawford v. Honig*, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1994)).

9                   With respect to counsel, they are considered qualified under Rule 23(a)(4) when they  
10 have experience in previous class actions and cases involving the same field of law. See *Lynch*  
11 *v. Rank*, 604 F. Supp. 30, 37 (N.D. Cal. 1984); *Marcus v. Heckler*, 620 F. Supp. 1218, 1223-24  
12 (N.D. Ill. 1985); *Adams v. Califano*, 474 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D. Md. 1979). Plaintiffs here are  
13 represented by attorneys from the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project who have extensive  
14 experience litigating class action lawsuits and other complex cases in federal court, including  
15 civil rights lawsuits on behalf of noncitizens.<sup>26</sup> These highly experienced class action and  
16 immigrant rights counsel are also joined in this case by attorneys from the Foster Pepper law  
17 firm who have extensive experience litigating constitutional and statutory rights lawsuits in the  
18 federal and state courts, including civil rights lawsuits on behalf of a variety of plaintiffs.<sup>27</sup>  
19 Defendants cannot credibly claim plaintiffs’ counsel are unqualified.

20                   With respect to the plaintiffs themselves, their interest in this case is shared with the other  
21 members of the Credible Fear Interview Class. It’s not antagonistic. Plaintiffs will fairly and  
22 adequately protect the interests of their fellow class members because plaintiffs seek the same  
23 justice for all similarly situated asylum seekers that they seek for themselves: declaratory and  
24

25 <sup>26</sup> *Declaration Of Matt Adams In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification at ¶¶1-8.*

26 <sup>27</sup> *Declaration Of Thomas F. Ahearne In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification at ¶¶1-7 and the bios attached as exhibits to that declaration.*

1 injunctive relief that stops defendants' illegally prolonging an asylum seeker's incarceration by  
2 delaying his or her credible fear interview determination more than 10 days after he or she  
3 requested asylum or expressed a fear of persecution to a DHS official. Plaintiffs do not seek  
4 money damages for themselves. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief for the Credible  
5 Fear Interview Class as a whole.

6 And even though a defendant can often "moot out" a class plaintiff's claim after the  
7 lawsuit is filed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that such a mooted out plaintiff may still  
8 serve as class representative when plaintiff's claim in the lawsuit is capable of repetition yet  
9 evading review. *Gerstein v. Pugh*, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); *Cty. of Riverside v.*  
10 *McLaughlin*, 500 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1991).

11 In short: the Credible Fear Interview Class defined above satisfies the adequate  
12 representation criterion of Rule 23(a)(4).

### 13 **5. An Authorized Category of Class Action** (*Rule 23(b)*)

14 One of the three authorized categories of class actions listed in Rule 23(b) are suits where  
15 "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the  
16 class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting  
17 the class as a whole." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).

18 That is exactly the situation here with the Credible Fear Interview Class. Class  
19 membership is expressly defined by defendants' conduct applicable to all class members – i.e.,  
20 defendants' not providing asylum seekers a credible fear determination within 10 days of  
21 requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official. Regardless of what this  
22 court ultimately rules is the defendants' legal duty with respect to credible fear determinations,  
23 the same law applies to all class members – so the same final injunctive relief and corresponding  
24 declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.

25 Defendants might contend that plaintiffs' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with  
26 respect to credible fear determinations should be rejected. But that contention does not defeat

1 class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) – for that rule “does not require [the court] to examine the  
 2 viability or bases of class members’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, but only to look  
 3 at whether class members seek uniform relief from a practice applicable to all of them.”  
 4 *Rodriguez*, 591 F.3d at 1125 (citation omitted). And that’s the case here. This suit seeks  
 5 uniform declaratory and injunctive relief against a practice of the defendants that is applicable to  
 6 all Credible Fear Interview Class members – namely, prolonging each member’s incarceration  
 7 by delaying that member’s credible fear interview determinations more than 10 days after  
 8 requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official.

9 A single injunction with a corresponding declaratory judgment with respect to  
 10 defendants’ above practice would also uniformly protect and vindicate the legal rights of all  
 11 members of the Credible Fear Interview Class – including plaintiffs. See, e.g., *Walters*, 145 F.3d  
 12 at 1047 (certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class based on defendants’ practice of providing deficient  
 13 notice of deportation procedures); *Parsons*, 754 F.3d at 689 (finding declaratory and injunctive  
 14 relief proper as to the whole class where “every [member] in the proposed class is allegedly  
 15 suffering the same (or at least a similar) injury and that injury can be alleviated for every class  
 16 member by uniform changes in ... policy and practice”).

17 In short, the Credible Fear Interview Class fits within the class action category expressly  
 18 authorized by Rule 23(b)(2).<sup>28</sup>

19  
 20 <sup>28</sup> *Although not necessary to add since the Credible Fear Interview Class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2),*  
 21 *plaintiffs note this class also satisfies Rule 23(b)(1) since requiring separate actions by the*  
 22 *members of this class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect*  
 23 *to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for*  
 24 *defendants, and requiring separate actions by the members of this class would create the risk of*  
 25 *adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be*  
 26 *dispositive of the interests of the other class members not parties to the individual adjudications,*  
*or would at least substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. This*  
*class also satisfies Rule 23(b)(3) since questions of law or fact common to members of this class*  
*predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to*  
*other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the legality of defendants’ practice*  
*of failing to provide a credible fear interview determinations within 10 days of a person’s*

1 **C. The “Bond Hearing Class” satisfies all four elements of Rule 23(a) and at least one**  
2 **of the alternative categories in Rule 23(b).**

3 This is the “**Bond Hearing Class**” requested in the Amended Complaint:<sup>29</sup>

4 All detained asylum seekers who entered the United States without inspection,  
5 were initially subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b),  
6 were determined to have a credible fear of persecution,  
7 but are not provided a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the  
8 hearing within 7 days of requesting a bond hearing.

9 *[The Amended Complaint confirms the immigration law meaning of “without inspection”.<sup>30</sup>]*

10 **1. Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1))**

11 Plaintiffs incorporate (rather than repeat) the law on this criterion set forth in  
12 Section IV.B.1 above.

13 Plaintiffs believe that at least several hundred asylum seekers currently fit within the  
14 Bond Hearing Class defined above.<sup>31</sup> Defendants know the exact number of asylum seekers they  
15 are detaining without providing the bond hearing specified in the above class definition. But  
16 defendants cannot truthfully deny that that exact number is far more than the 17, 27, 41, 46, and  
17 48 members that were sufficiently “numerous” for class certification in the cases cited in  
18 Section IV.B.1 above.

19 Nor can defendants truthfully deny that it would be impracticable to join all the  
20 individual members of the Bond Hearing Class in this suit.

21 *expressing a fear of persecution or requesting asylum. But since only one of the three Rule 23(b)*  
22 *categories need be satisfied, class certification can be granted under Rule 23(b)(2) alone.*

23 <sup>29</sup> *Amended Complaint at ¶¶149 (class definition), 128-129, 150-157.*

24 <sup>30</sup> *Amended Complaint at ¶¶46-47 (confirming the meaning of “without inspection” in the*  
25 *Amended Complaint’s proposed Bond Hearing Class has its ordinary immigration law meaning:*  
26 *an asylum seeker “enters without inspection” if he or she (1) crosses the U.S. border at a*  
*location that is between the Ports Of Entry designated by the U.S. government, or (2) crosses the*  
*border at a Port Of Entry but does not openly declares them self to a federal agent.*

<sup>31</sup> *Amended Complaint at ¶¶149-150 (alleging on information and belief that at least several*  
*hundred asylum seekers currently fit within the bond hearing class).*

PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERT MOTION RE:  
“CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW CLASS” &  
“BOND HEARING CLASS” - 17

NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT  
615 Second Avenue, Suite 400  
Seattle, WA 98104  
Telephone (206) 957-8611

1 In short: the Bond Hearing Class defined above satisfies the numerosity/impracticality  
2 criterion of Rule 23(a)(1) for the same type of reasons that the prior class did.

3 **2. Commonality** (*Rule 23(a)(2)*)

4 Plaintiffs incorporate (rather than repeat) the law on this criterion set forth in  
5 Section IV.B.2 above.

6 By definition, the Bond Hearing Class is expressly limited to members who have suffered  
7 the same injury – i.e., being a detained asylum seeker subject to defendants’ practice of failing to  
8 provide a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing within 7 days of  
9 requesting a bond hearing.<sup>32</sup>

10 And that injury – the government’s failing to provide such asylum seekers their bond  
11 hearing with procedural protections within 7 days of requesting a bond hearing – is capable of  
12 class-wide resolution through declaratory relief declaring the government’s failure unlawful  
13 under the Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, APA, or federal asylum statutes, and injunctive  
14 relief requiring the government’s unlawful conduct to cease.

15 In short: the Bond Hearing Class defined above satisfies the commonality criterion of  
16 Rule 23(a)(2).

17 **3. Typicality** (*Rule 23(a)(3)*)

18 Plaintiffs incorporate (rather than repeat) the law on this criterion set forth in  
19 Section IV.B.3 above.

20 In this case, plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the government’s prolonging their  
21 incarceration by delaying their required bond hearings are not just typical of other Bond Hearing  
22 Class members. They’re the same. By definition, plaintiffs and the other Bond Hearing Class  
23

24 <sup>32</sup> As noted earlier, the Bond Hearing Class is defined as “All detained asylum seekers who  
25 entered the United States without inspection, were initially subject to expedited removal  
26 proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), were determined to have a credible fear of persecution,  
but are not provided a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing  
within 7 days of requesting a bond hearing.” *Supra*, Section IV.C.

1 members suffered the same injury in fact: not being provided a bond hearing with a verbatim  
2 transcript or recording of the hearing within 7 days of requesting a bond hearing. And plaintiffs’  
3 claim with respect to the legality of that government conduct is the same as fellow class  
4 members: defendant’s practice is unlawful under the Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment,  
5 APA, and federal asylum statutes.

6 In short: the Bond Hearing Class defined above satisfies the typicality criterion of  
7 Rule 23(a)(3).

8 **4. Adequate Representation** *(Rule 23(a)(4))*

9 Plaintiffs incorporate (rather than repeat) the law on this criterion set forth in  
10 Section IV.B.4 above.

11 Plaintiffs also incorporate (rather than repeat) the qualifications of counsel explained in  
12 Section IV.B.4 above.

13 And with respect to the plaintiffs themselves, their interest in this case is shared with the  
14 other members of the Bond Hearing Class. It’s not antagonistic. Plaintiffs will fairly and  
15 adequately protect the interests of their fellow class members because plaintiffs seek the same  
16 justice for all similarly situated asylum seekers that they seek for themselves: declaratory and  
17 injunctive relief that stops defendants’ illegally prolonging an asylum seeker’s incarceration by  
18 failing to provide a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing within  
19 7 days of requesting a bond hearing. Plaintiffs do not seek money damages for themselves in  
20 this class action. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief for the Bond Hearing Class as a  
21 whole.

22 In short: the Bond Hearing Class defined above satisfies the adequate representation  
23 criterion of Rule 23(a)(4).

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**5. An Authorized Category of Class Action (Rule 23(b))**

Plaintiffs incorporate (rather than repeat) the law on Rule 23(b)’s alternative criterion that was set forth in Section IV.B.5 above.

Seeking uniform relief from a practice applicable to all Bond Hearing Class members is exactly the case here. This suit seeks uniform declaratory and injunctive relief against a government practice applicable to all Bond Hearing Class members – namely, the government’s failing to provide asylum seekers determined to have a credible fear of persecution a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing within 7 days of requesting a bond hearing. And a single injunction with a corresponding declaratory judgment would uniformly protect and vindicate the legal rights of all Bond Hearing Class members – including plaintiffs. The Bond Hearing Class accordingly fits within the category authorized by Rule 23(b)(2).<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> *Although not necessary to add since the Bond Hearing Class satisfies Rule 23(b)(2), plaintiffs note this class also satisfies Rules 23(b)(1) & (3) for the same reasons noted in Section IV.B.5 above – but since only one of the three Rule 23(b) categories need be satisfied, class certification can be granted under Rule 23(b)(2) alone. See supra footnote 28.*

1  
2 **V. CONCLUSION**

3 For the reasons detailed in this motion, the Credible Fear Interview Class and Bond  
4 Hearing Class proposed in the Amended Complaint are entitled to class certification under  
5 Rule 23. Plaintiffs accordingly request that this Court grant this class certification motion, and  
6 thus:

- 7 A. Certify the following **Credible Fear Interview Class**: “All detained asylum seekers  
8 in the United States subject to expedited removal proceedings under  
9 8 U.S.C. §1225(b) who are not provided a credible fear determination within 10 days  
10 of requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official.”
- 11 B. Designate plaintiffs as representatives of the Credible Fear Interview Class, and  
12 appoint their counsel as class counsel.
- 13
- 14 C. Certify the following **Bond Hearing Class**: “All detained asylum seekers who  
15 entered the United States without inspection, were initially subject to expedited  
16 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b), were determined to have a credible  
17 fear of persecution, but are not provided a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or  
18 recording of the hearing within 7 days of requesting a bond hearing.”
- 19 D. Designate plaintiffs as representatives of the Bond Hearing Class, and appoint their  
20 counsel as class counsel.
- 21

22 A proposed Order is submitted with this motion.

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1 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018.

2  
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PLAINTIFFS' CLASS CERT MOTION RE:  
"CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW CLASS" &  
"BOND HEARING CLASS" - 22

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on July 30, 2018, I had the foregoing electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to those attorneys of record registered on the CM/ECF system. All other parties shall be served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018.

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